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Background: Many developed countries are reforming healthcare payment systems in order to limit costs and
improve clinical outcomes. Knowledge on how different groups of professional stakeholders trade off the merits
and downsides of healthcare payment systems is limited.
Methods: Using a discrete choice experiment we asked a sample of physicians, policy makers, healthcare
executives and researchers from Canada, Europe, Oceania, and the United States to choose between profiles of
hypothetical outcomes on eleven healthcare performance objectives which may arise from a healthcare payment
system reform. We used a Bayesian D-optimal design with partial profiles, which enables studying a large number
of attributes, i.e. the eleven performance objectives, in the experiment.
Results: Our findings suggest that (a) moving from current payment systems to a value-based system is supported
by physicians, despite an income trade-off, if effectiveness and long term cost containment improve. (b) Physicians
would gain in terms of overall objective fulfillment in Eastern Europe and the US, but not in Canada, Oceania and
Western Europe. Finally, (c) such payment reform more closely aligns the overall fulfillment of objectives between
stakeholders such as physicians versus healthcare executives.
Conclusions: Although the findings should be interpreted with caution due to the potential selection effects of
participants, it seems that the value driven nature of newly proposed and/or introduced care payment reforms is
more closely aligned with what stakeholders favor in some health systems, but not in others. Future studies,
including the use of random samples, should examine the contextual factors that explain such differences in
values and buy-in.
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Policy makers of many developed countries are trying to
strengthen the long term sustainability of healthcare by
reforming healthcare payment systems. They want to
replace or enhance salary and fee for service (FFS) pay-
ment systems by other incentive structures, such as pay
for performance, shared savings, partial capitation, and
bundled payment [1]. These incentives aim to reconcile
a broader spectrum of healthcare objectives varying
from quality, cost and equity to patient centeredness and
coordination of care.
The literature to date consists of about 130 effect
studies of healthcare payment reform, the majority of
them covering the US (50%) and the UK (45%). The
remaining studies are spread across Australia, Germany,
the Netherlands, Spain and Italy. Studies in Canada and
Eastern Europe are largely lacking. Results show that,
although reforms seem promising in the long term, short
term effects have been disappointing [2-4]. This could
partially be explained by growing pains, practical or
technical difficulties and the need for short term in-
vestments to make the new systems work [5-9]. Never-
theless, more fundamental impediments could be at
play. Enthusiasm from physicians and healthcare orga-
nizations is lacking as, in contrast to FFS payment
systems, new healthcare payment systems require
taking financial risks [10,11].
Physicians and healthcare executives are unlikely to
engage in a new healthcare payment system if they are
not in line with what they value. Knowledge on how
different groups of professional stakeholders trade off
the merits and downsides of healthcare payment systems
is limited. Are the new incentive structures a better
match with key priorities of healthcare providers, physi-
cians in particular, even if financial security is at play?
Will priorities of physicians, policy makers and health-
care executives converge or diverge as a consequence of
the new payment systems? And are the answers to these
questions the same across geographical areas with a
different health system and context? For each of these
questions, we need in-depth knowledge of the values
and trade-offs associated with healthcare objectives.
In this paper, we describe the design and analysis
results of a discrete choice experiment (DCE) that we
performed to examine how improvements, deteriora-
tions and status quo outcomes in healthcare perform-
ance objectives due to a payment system reform are
traded off by physicians, policy makers, healthcare exec-
utives and researchers from Canada, Eastern Europe,
Oceania, the US and Western Europe. The DCE is part
of a larger study that also includes the rating study of
Van Herck et al. [12] in which the same stakeholders
directly stated preference ratings for seven healthcare
payment systems. The DCE approach is, however, indirect,measuring stakeholder preferences for payment reform
outcomes on eleven health system performance objectives.
We use the analysis results of the DCE to compare goal
fulfillment and stakeholder alignment between current
and newly proposed payment structures.
Methods
The DCE method is a survey technique with a growing
use in healthcare to quantify people’s preferences by ob-
serving their stated choices in a number of hypothetical
scenarios, called choice sets [13-15]. Each choice set
consists of two or more competing options, out of which
respondents have to indicate the option they like better.
The options are also called profiles and are defined in
terms of a specified set of attributes or dimensions that
differ in a number of levels. The data from a DCE allow
the assessment of the relative importance of each attri-
bute in the total value of each of the profiles under
study.
Conducting a DCE involves the following steps: (i)
identification of the attributes and attribute levels, (ii)
experimental design of the choice sets, (iii) questionnaire
development, (iv) study sample and (v) data analysis. We
discuss these steps in turn.
Identification of the attributes and attribute levels
As attributes for the DCE, we carefully selected eleven
health system performance objectives or domains shown
in Table 1. For each objective, we specified three possible
outcomes as levels, namely a ‘positive’, ‘negative’ and ‘no
change’ outcome.
To select the health system performance domains for
study in the DCE, we consulted the literature as well as
two expert panels. We interviewed 46 representatives of
the stakeholder groups of interest to gauge their opinion
about care payment systems and their outcomes [16].
Using a broadly exploratory approach, we identified 25
potentially relevant health system performance domains.
Based on literature review, we regrouped the perform-
ance domains and reduced them from 25 to 12. We then
asked 23 international care payment experts to rate each
of the 12 health system performance domains on a 5-
point scale in terms of their importance in health
policy decision making about care payment systems.
The importance rankings of the 12 performance do-
mains led us to select 11 performance domains most
likely to influence the preferences for care payment
outcomes.
Experimental design of the choice sets
The DCE presented participants with 18 choice sets of
two alternative profiles with performance outcomes that
payment change in their health system would generate.
For each choice set, participants had to indicate the
Table 1 Healthcare system performance objectives or domains considered to be relevant to assess care payment
system effects
Performance objective Definition
1. Clinical effectiveness and patient safety The degree to which the level of health gain is maximized and harm to patients is
minimized as a consequence of care. This domain refers to the effect of the payment
scheme, and its sustainability, on patient outcome in a broad sense (life expectancy,
relief of pain, functional capacity, etc.).
2. Best practice service use The degree to which services are provided based on scientific knowledge to all who
could benefit (avoiding underuse) and are refrained from being provided to those not
likely to benefit (avoiding overuse). This implies that (1) patients do not receive care
that cannot help them and/or the risks of which outweigh the benefits and (2) patients
reliably receive care where the known benefits outweigh the risks.
3. Care equity The degree to which care and its optimal outcome are delivered and attained for all
people, without variation based on patient characteristics (such as gender, age, ethnicity,
geographical location and socioeconomic status), unless there is a valid clinical rationale.
4. Care coordination, teamwork and continuity The degree to which provider contributions are well integrated to optimize the delivery
of care by the same healthcare provider throughout the course of care, with appropriate
and timely communication, referral and collaboration between providers (both within
and between provider organizations).
5. Patient centeredness The degree to which care is respectful of and responsive to individual patient preferences
and values, ensuring that patient preferences and values guide major clinical decisions.
6. Timeliness The degree to which waits and delays are avoided.
7. Short term cost containment and budget safety The degree to which expenditure of financial resources is contained in short term. Short
term expenditure may not only be due to cost of care (including potential waste), but
also due to investment in system organization (e.g. cost of implementation).
8. Long term cost containment and budget safety The degree to which expenditure of financial resources is contained in long term. Long
term expenditure may not only be due to cost of care (including potential waste), but
also due to maintenance of system organization (e.g. cost of measuring and updating).
9. Provider wellness The degree to which provider wellness is sustained, improves or deteriorates, as affected
by job satisfaction, income (in)security, workload, autonomy and respect of professional
values.
10. Innovation The degree to which innovation of care, at the clinical treatment and/or organizational
system level, is encouraged. This includes the strategy and investment focus of the
provider (e.g. on quality vs. quantity).
11. Gaming the system The degree to which providers consciously or unconsciously manipulate the system to
increase personal financial gain. Gaming includes both data manipulation and/or patient
selection (shifting care for high expenditure patients to other providers or providing less
than appropriate care).
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combinations of ‘positive’, ‘negative’ or ‘no change’ out-
comes on the eleven health system performance do-
mains under study. We designed each choice set using a
maximum of five domains to reduce the cognitive
burden on the respondents. The profiles in such choice
sets are called ‘partial profiles’ [17-19].
We did not label the partial profiles in terms of
specific care payment systems to ensure that only out-
come combinations as such determined participants’
preferences and not subjective connotations that specific
care payment systems may carry. Coloring highlighted
the positive and negative outcomes to facilitate the
preference formation process. Figure 1 shows an example
of a discrete choice task in which participants had to
choose between situation A and situation B.
We created three different surveys by constructing a
partial profile design consisting of 54 choice sets anddividing it into three groups of 18 choice sets. The three
surveys appear in Appendix A. We submitted the three
surveys to groups of three respondents to make sure
that each survey was filled out about an equal number
of times. Using a design consisting of different surveys
results in more precise parameter estimates of the under-
lying discrete choice model than a design consisting of a
single survey [19,20]. As discrete choice model, we used a
multinomial logit (MNL) model, which is common prac-
tice in discrete choice design and analysis [21]. The partial
profile design in Appendix A is D-optimal for the MNL
model, meaning that it guarantees precise parameter esti-
mates [22].
Each choice set of the partial profile design in
Appendix A varies the levels of at most five attributes
and ignores the remaining attributes, which are
assumed constant at any possible level indicated by
‘*’ and ‘§’ signs. These constant attributes differ from
Figure 1 Example of a discrete choice task.
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attributes with the ‘*’ sign using the attribute balance
approach that attempts to hold each attribute constant
in an equal number of choice sets and to pair constant
attributes an equal number of times [18,19]. That is
why over all 54 choice sets in the design, each attribute
is constant in either 29 or 30 choice sets, not taking
into account the constant attributes with the ‘§’ sign. The
latter ones are added to make the design D-optimal,
resulting in a better estimation performance.
The D-optimal partial profile design takes into account
prior beliefs about the respondents’ preferences. It gen-
erally holds that a ‘positive’ outcome in a performance
domain is preferred to a ‘no change’ outcome, which, in
turn, is preferred to a ‘negative’ outcome. In addition,
according to prospect theory which states that people
are loss averse, avoiding a negative outcome is likely
more dominant in preference formation compared to
trading off a neutral versus a positive outcome [23]. We
also ranked the performance domains in order of ex-
pected importance and expressed our uncertainty re-
garding the a priori orderings of the performance
domains and the performance outcomes in a multivari-
ate normal prior distribution. In Appendix B, we de-
scribe the multivariate normal prior distribution used to
optimize the design of the DCE. The design that maxi-
mizes the information content of the DCE (as measured
by the log-determinant of the information matrix; see
[22]), when averaged over a given prior distribution, is
called a Bayesian D-optimal design. The Bayesian D-
optimal design approach is increasingly considered
state-of-the-art for constructing DCEs [22,24-26]. One
major benefit of Bayesian D-optimal designs is that,using a proper prior distribution, they avoid choice sets
in which one profile is completely dominating the other
profile(s) on every attribute [27].
Questionnaire development
The actual questionnaire consisted of two parts. In the
first part, we asked respondents a number of back-
ground questions such as their age, seniority, gender,
stakeholder role and domain of expertise. Also, we ques-
tioned respondents on the geographical area they work
in, the healthcare payment systems in use, their specialty
or degree of medicine and the care practice setting. In
the second part, we performed the DCE by presenting
respondents with 18 choice sets of two performance out-
come profiles. The questionnaire language was English
and data were collected online over the year 2011.
The medical ethics committee of the University Hospitals
Leuven - UZ Leuven, Belgium, waived the need for a formal
approval of the study, due to the non-interventional nature
and because the study is not directed at patients. We ob-
tained a written informed consent from all participants.
Study sample
The study sample consisted of physicians, policy makers,
healthcare executives and individual healthcare payment
researchers across Canada, Eastern Europe, Oceania, the
US and Western Europe, but was not designed to be
representative of each of these four stakeholder groups
and five geographical areas. To reach physicians, policy
makers and healthcare executives, we asked 48 inter-
national professional healthcare societies within the field
of medicine, health policy, care management and public
health research to invite their members to participate in
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of peer-reviewed papers on the topic of care payment
systems an invitation by email to participate. The health-
care societies could make use of various communication
channels to invite members to participate, including
direct emailing, newsletters and/or websites. Some soci-
eties applied randomized sampling to select members,
whereas others invited all their members. In addition,
membership to a society consists of sub-societies (e.g. at
the national level within Europe), organizations (e.g.
hospitals), and/or individual members. The two former
types could make use of a cascade invitation procedure
to support involvement. To minimize the workload and
to standardize the process, we provided the societies
with preformatted letters containing the web survey
links.
A total of 547 stakeholders participated in the study.
Their characteristics are shown in Table 2. Respondents
are predominantly male (69%) with a mean age of
50 years and a mean seniority of 23 years. They assume
the following stakeholder role(s): physicians (67%), policy
makers (22%), healthcare executives (34%) and researchers
(30%). The most commonly cited domain of expertise is
medicine (69%) and among the geographical areas the
US is most represented (37%). Also, a large part of the
physicians work in teaching hospitals (34%). Stake-
holders evaluated 8,544 of a total of 9,846 choice sets
shown (computed as 547*18 choice sets), which corre-
sponds to a completion rate of 87%.
Data analysis
We estimated a MNL model describing the overall pref-
erences for care payment reform outcomes in the eleven
performance domains, taken into account the impact of
stakeholder role and geographical area and adjusting for
age, seniority, gender and care payment systems in use.
Respondents’ propensity to opt for a profile is the model’s
dependent variable. The eleven performance domains are
the main independent variables which are assumed cat-
egorical, having the ‘positive’, ‘negative’ and ‘no change’
payment outcomes as levels.
The MNL model relies on a utility function that is the
sum of the marginal utilities of the attributes’ main and
interaction effects under study [28]. The interactions
involve combinations of attributes and respondent sub-
group variables to investigate the heterogeneity in pref-
erences between respondent subgroups. We estimated
the model effects or parameters using a maximum likeli-
hood approach. We computed the overall significance of
the attributes using likelihood ratio (LR) tests and mea-
sured their relative importance by –log(p-value of the
LR test). Because absolute values of the marginal utilities
have no direct interpretation, we expressed all parameters
relative to a reference parameter or ‘golden standard’.As a reference parameter, we chose the parameter at-
tached to a deterioration in ‘effectiveness and patient
safety’, because a deterioration in this domain has, by
far, the highest (negative) impact on respondents’
choices (see Results). We standardized all parameters
with respect to the absolute value of the reference par-
ameter, so that the parameter values are to be inter-
preted with respect to the reference value of -1, with
the sign indicating a positive (+) or negative (-) impact
on choice. We carried out the entire data analysis using
the Choice Modeling platform in the statistical soft-
ware package JMP 11.
Results
Performance objectives defining the choice for a
healthcare payment system
All eleven healthcare performance objectives or do-
mains have a significant impact on stakeholders’ choices
(p < 0.0001) after adjustment for age, seniority, gender,
care payment systems in use, stakeholder role and geo-
graphical area. Figure 2 ranks the performance domains
in order of importance. The importance of a domain is
expressed relatively to the most important domain ‘ef-
fectiveness and patient safety’, the importance of which
is set to 100. The domain next in line is ‘long term cost
containment’ and is only about half as important as
‘effectiveness and patient safety’. ‘Provider wellness’,
which includes physicians’ income, a key element to
most health economic models of care payment, takes up
a sixth position. The domains ‘timeliness’, ‘care equity’,
‘gaming’ and ‘short term cost containment’ are least im-
portant in setting objectives for care payment reform.
The importance of care payment reform outcomes in
each performance domain
Figure 3 shows the marginal utility values attached to
the positive, negative and status quo outcomes in each
performance domain. These marginal utility values are
significant main effects (p < 0.0001) expressed relatively
to the golden standard of no harm to effectiveness, the
main effect of which is set to -1. The values do not fully
align with the importance ranking of the performance
domains shown in Figure 2, which is due to the presence
of a number of significant interaction effects. Especially
for the less important domains (such as ‘timeliness’ and
‘care equity’), interactions co-determine the impact on
total utility (see Impact of stakeholder role and Impact
of geographical area).
As expected, avoiding unintended consequences (nega-
tive payment outcomes) is generally of higher importance
than intended ‘improvement’ consequences (positive out-
comes). Only for ‘long term cost containment’ and ‘gam-
ing’, improvement is somewhat more important than
avoiding deterioration. The status quo outcomes in the
Table 2 Characteristics of the 547 respondents in the
study
Characteristic Value
Age 50 ± 11 years*
Seniority 23 ± 11 years*
Female sex 31%
Stakeholder role, based on work content°
Physician 67%
Policy maker 22%
Healthcare executive 34%
Researcher 30%
Domain of expertise, self-rated°
Medicine 69%
Nursing 3%
Allied health 6%
Policy 17%
Executive management 17%
Financial management 8%
Public health 10%
Quality of care 17%
Health economics 13%
Psychology 2%
Social sciences 3%
Human resource management 4%
Law 5%
Ethics 4%
Insurance 5%
Pharmacy 3%
Geographical area
Canada 10%
Eastern Europe 9%
Western Europe 25%
Oceania 18%
United States of America 37%
Practice setting§°
Solo primary care 13%
Group primary care 19%
Non-teaching hospital 8%
Teaching hospital 34%
Care payment system in use to pay physicians°
Salary 67%
Fee for service 60%
Episode-based 6%
Capitation 16%
Table 2 Characteristics of the 547 respondents in the
study (Continued)
Quality bonus or adjustment 16%
Evidence informed case rate 2%
Never event non-reimbursement/warranty 1%
*The ± values are means ± SD.
°Respondents could select more than one response category.
§These characteristics pertain to physicians only.
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barely, mostly in a positive way. Only the status quo out-
comes of ‘long term cost containment’ and ‘gaming’ have
a slightly negative impact on stakeholders’ choices.
Impact of stakeholder role
We compare the choices of each of the four stakeholder
groups to those of the other three stakeholder groups.
We first examine the differences in marginal utility
values of care payment reform outcomes between physi-
cians and non-physicians. We then proceed with a
discussion on the choices of policy makers, healthcare
executives and researchers.
As shown in Figure 4, physicians differ from non-
physicians with respect to their preferences for five of
the eleven performance objectives. More specifically,
physicians attach more importance to ‘effectiveness and
patient safety’ (p = 0.0046), ‘coordination’ (p = 0.0097),
‘provider wellness’ (p < 0.0001) and ‘timeliness’ (p = 0.0044)
than non-physicians. For ‘short term cost containment’, the
opposite is true (p = 0.0057).
Concerning ‘effectiveness and patient safety’, avoiding
harm affects physicians’ choices 0.30 times more (com-
puted as 1.13/0.87 – 1) than non-physicians’ choices. On
the other hand, physicians and non-physicians value an
improvement in this performance domain through
payment reform to about the same extent. Concerning
‘coordination’, physicians value reform that avoids de-
terioration and provides improvement more than non-
physicians (0.14 and 0.49 times more, respectively).
This is also the case for ‘provider wellness’ and ‘timeli-
ness’, but the differences are more outspoken (1.46 and
0.63 times more for ‘provider wellness’, and 0.75 and
0.65 times more for ‘timeliness’). The opposite is true
for ‘short term cost containment’. For this performance
domain, physicians prefer avoiding deterioration and
enhancing improvement less than non-physicians (0.57
and 0.41 times less).
Investigating policy makers as a stakeholder group,
we observe only a significant difference in preference
evaluation for ‘gaming’ compared to non-policy makers
(p = 0.0002). Policy makers attach less importance to
avoiding deterioration/expansion in gaming (0.16 times
less) and more importance to improving/reducing gaming
(0.72 times more).
Figure 2 Importance of the eleven healthcare performance objectives or domains in the MNL model relative to the most important objective
‘effectiveness and patient safety’.
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significant difference in preferences for ‘provider well-
ness’ compared to non-healthcare executives (p < 0.0001).
Healthcare executives favor avoiding deterioration and en-
hancing improvement more than non-healthcare execu-
tives (0.57 and 0.43 times more).
The last stakeholder group concerns the re-
searchers with an expertise in care payment reform.Figure 3 Marginal utility values (main effects) of the positive, negative a
performance objectives.Researchers pay more attention to ‘effectiveness and
patient safety’ (p = 0.0021) and ‘long term cost con-
tainment’ (p = 0.0002) than non-researchers. They
favor avoiding deterioration and enhancing improve-
ment more than non-researchers (0.30 and 0.26
times more for ‘effectiveness and patient safety’, and
0.67 and 0.39 times more for ‘long term cost
containment’).nd status quo outcomes related to the eleven healthcare
Figure 4 Marginal utility values of the positive, negative and status quo outcomes showing significant differences in preference evaluation
between physicians and non-physicians.
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Figure 5 shows the significant geographical differences
in the valuation of five of the eleven performance
domains: ‘effectiveness and patient safety’ (p < 0.0001),
‘best practice service use’ (p = 0.0004), ‘coordination’
(p = 0.0096), ‘care equity’ (p = 0.0056) and ‘gaming’
(p = 0.0402).
Overall, stakeholders from Oceania pay the most
importance to the effects of care payment reform in
the five performance domains, while stakeholders fromFigure 5 Marginal utility values of the positive, negative and status quo ou
between geographical areas.Canada pay the least importance. The importance
values of stakeholders from the US and Western and
Eastern Europe range in between. The preferences of
stakeholders from the US best match with those of
stakeholders from Oceania. Both are by far most con-
cerned about the effects of a change in ‘effectiveness
and patient safety’. Together with stakeholders from
Western Europe, they favor avoiding deterioration
more than improvement in this domain. This is in
contrast with stakeholders from Eastern Europe andtcomes showing significant differences in preference evaluation
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in ‘effectiveness and patient safety’ than to avoiding
deterioration.
Impact of physicians’ payment systems currently in use
We compare stakeholders’ choices based on the current
payment systems in use to pay physicians (see Table 2
for the different payment forms). Because respondents
could select more than one payment form, it is not
surprising that we found no significant differences in the
evaluation of the care payment reform outcomes be-
tween most payment forms in use, including salary, fee
for service, episode-based payment, capitation, evidence
informed case rates and never event non-reimbursement
or warranty. There is, however, a significant effect from
the use of a quality bonus or adjustment. Using this
payment form, stakeholders pay less importance to the
outcome effects in ‘provider wellness’ compared to not
using it (0.41, 0.35 and 0.73 times less for avoiding
deterioration, improvement and preserving status quo).
Comparison of goal fulfillment and alignment between
current and newly proposed payment structures
Newly proposed payment structures differ from current
payment structures in the sense that they include a
widening of scope of payment through bundled or global
payment, a strengthening of primary care by means of
partial capitation and a risk sharing component in the
form of episode-based payment or capitation. These ele-
ments aim to improve coordination, innovation and long
term cost containment.
A second difference with current payment structures
is the inclusion of evidence based process and outcome
criteria in payment to improve effectiveness and patient
safety, best practice service use and long term cost
containment by ways of pay for performance, shared sav-
ings, evidence informed case rates, and/or warranty use.
In newly proposed payment structures, we also take
unintended consequences into account, including a de-
terioration of gaming [29] and limited neglect of untar-
geted quality aspects, yet not to an extent that the gain
in effectiveness would be undone [30]. We let care
equity at status quo, because findings for this objective
are inconsistent [31].
Furthermore, a reduced degree of financial security as
part of provider wellness is inherent to risk sharing. Re-
forms also increase short term costs due to transaction
costs.
We calculated the relative difference in total utility be-
tween the newly proposed payment system and the
current payment system for each stakeholder group and
each geographical area. To obtain the total utility for the
current payment system, we added up the marginal util-
ities attached to the status quo outcomes for all elevenperformance domains. The newly proposed payment
system is characterized by improvements in ‘effective-
ness and patient safety’, ‘long term cost containment’,
‘best practice service use’, ‘coordination’ and ‘innovation’,
by unintended deterioration in ‘provider wellness’, ‘pa-
tient centeredness’, ‘timeliness’, ‘gaming’ and ‘short term
cost containment’ and by a status quo in ‘care equity’.
Table 3 describes the payment reform impact on total
utility for each stakeholder group and each geographical
area. Comparing the total utilities between the current
and newly proposed payment system using the relative
difference between these utilities shows that the new
payment system agrees much more with stakeholder
preferences than the current payment system for almost
all stakeholder groups, except for physicians from
Canada, Oceania and Western Europe and healthcare
executives from Oceania who would need to concede a
trade-off in their utilities. Moreover, one expects that, in
order of importance, healthcare executives and re-
searchers from Eastern Europe and policy makers from
Canada derive most utility from the new payment sys-
tem. From a geographical perspective, Eastern Europe
clearly has most to gain in total utility after a payment
reform.
Finally, we studied the degree of goal alignment be-
tween physicians, policy makers, healthcare executives
and researchers by comparing differences in total utility
between the stakeholder groups in the current and new
payment system. We observed that the total utilities be-
tween stakeholder groups become more closely aligned
in the new payment system, in the sense that the differ-
ences in total utility between physicians and policy
makers diminish. This result is in contrast with the
result of the more direct preference enquiry of Van
Herck et al. [12], which revealed that care payment pref-
erences between the stakeholder groups appear to be
misaligned. There is thus a discrepancy in preferences
that stakeholders directly state and those that are indir-
ectly derived from a DCE.
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is one of the first studies using a
DCE to examine how stakeholder preferences are af-
fected by changes in health system performance objec-
tives or domains and what the implications are for care
payment reform. Besides the effect of ‘positive’, ‘negative’
and ‘no change’ outcomes on eleven performance objec-
tives, we also investigated the impact of stakeholder role
and geographical area, while adjusting for age, seniority
and gender of stakeholders. We report results using
choice data from 547 respondents.
We found that all eleven performance objectives have
a significant impact on stakeholder preferences, with the
impact of ‘effectiveness and patient safety’ standing out.
Table 3 Predicted total utility by stakeholder group, before and after proposed payment reform
Geographical area Stakeholder
group
Total utility of
status quo
Total utility after proposed
payment reform
Relative
difference*
Canada Physician 0.61 0.48 −0.21
Policy maker −0.04 0.82 21.50
Healthcare executive 0.37 0.48 0.30
Researcher 0.42 1.18 1.81
Oceania Physician 1.57 1.18 −0.25
Policy maker 0.92 1.52 0.65
Healthcare executive 1.33 1.18 −0.11
Researcher 1.38 1.88 0.36
Eastern Europe Physician 0.22 1.40 5.36
Policy maker −0.43 1.74 4.05
Healthcare executive −0.02 1.40 70.00
Researcher 0.03 2.10 69.00
Western Europe Physician 0.96 0.80 −0.17
Policy maker 0.31 1.14 2.68
Healthcare executive 0.72 0.80 0.11
Researcher 0.77 1.50 0.95
United States Physician 1.00 1.23 0.23
Policy maker 0.35 1.57 3.49
Healthcare executive 0.76 1.23 0.62
Researcher 0.81 1.93 1.38
*Relative difference is the difference between the total utility after proposed payment reform and the total utility of the status quo, expressed relatively to the
total utility of the status quo.
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practice service use’, which are only about half as import-
ant as ‘effectiveness and patient safety’. Also, our initial
assumptions have been mostly confirmed: except for
‘long term cost containment’ and ‘gaming’, unintended
consequences (negative outcomes) of payment reform
have a stronger impact on respondents’ choices than
intended consequences (positive outcomes). One pos-
sible explanation why preferences for improvement in
‘long term cost containment’ and avoidance of ‘gaming’
are higher despite any unintended consequences is a
high level of dissatisfaction with current performance.
All stakeholders seem to crave for an improvement in
long term cost containment and better checks on gam-
ing of the system.
Physicians, policy makers, health care executives and re-
searchers have their own priorities, differing further by
geographical area. Our study findings seem to match well
with the work content of each group. Physicians focus
more on doing no harm to effectiveness and patient safety,
coordination, provider wellness and timeliness. Policy
makers are more concerned about gaming and healthcare
executives about financial security. Researchers focus
more on long term outcome and cost containment.Our findings confirm that newly proposed payment
structures, aligning care payment with health improve-
ment and long term cost containment, combined with a
widening of scope, increase the overall fulfillment of the
objectives of most stakeholder groups across geograph-
ical areas. This is in line with the formalized models of
David Cutler, focusing on social welfare optimization
[32]. Value is confirmed to be a better care payment
criterion than volume and intensity. However, as a con-
sequence of the trade-off with financial risk and other
unintended consequences, the overall goal fulfillment of
physicians in Canada, Oceania and Western Europe
diminishes. Possible explanations are that Oceania is in-
ternally perceived as a high performer already, Canadian
physicians focus more on conservative objectives for
payment, and in Western Europe one does not feel suffi-
cient pressure yet on cost containment. These hypothet-
ical factors are likely to change during the following
years and decades as a consequence of external pressure
on health systems. In Eastern Europe and the US, this
seems to be already the case. In addition, the findings
confirm a closer alignment between stakeholder groups
as a result of new payment structures, which is opposite
to the result of the preference rating study of Van Herck
Kessels et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2015) 15:191 Page 11 of 14et al. [12], in which stakeholder preferences were directly
enquired.
It is noteworthy to observe that all stakeholder groups
in all geographical areas attach hardly any value to short
term cost consequences of payment reform. In contrast,
they value long term cost consequences very highly.
Short term cost considerations are very near the tail of
the choice criteria. Could it be that stakeholders perceive
care payment reform as a long term instead of a short
term strategy, because short term gains are not realistic
to reach?
Our results should be interpreted with caution because
of the following limitations: (1) Findings are based on
scenario evaluation and not on real-life observation. We
cannot be certain that the choices made in the DCE
guide actual decision making. (2) In the DCE we focused
on large geographical areas, and not on separate coun-
tries or states. In this respect, Eastern Europe is probably
the most heterogeneous area in terms of healthcare pay-
ment systems, attitude of health policy makers and
national income. (3) As healthcare providers among the
stakeholders, we focused on physicians only, and did not
consider nurses or other medical assistants. (4) A sample
size of 547 participants is limited from a non-DCE sur-
vey perspective. However, because most participants in
the DCE contributed to 18 observations each, a sample
size of 547 is considered to be large. The large amount
of significant results from this study confirm our rea-
soning. (5) The sample is most likely representative of
motivated, early responders only, who have a good un-
derstanding of English.
Based on the study findings, we formulate the follow-
ing recommendations:
First and foremost, unintended consequences for ef-
fectiveness and patient safety should be avoided by
means of risk adjustment, evening out ‘treating to the
test’ in pay for performance and monitoring of payment
consequences.
Second, all stakeholder groups highly value a positive
effect of payment reform on effectiveness and patient
safety. Policy makers should regularly demonstrate,
based on the targets that physicians care about, that
payment reform indeed improves effectiveness and
patient safety, albeit often in subsequent incremental
steps.
Third, we recommend accommodating for provider
wellness in any way possible. Many proposed reforms
share an inherent reduction of physicians’ financial se-
curity. The same seems true for autonomy. Yet, there
are payment design formulas that respect autonomy of
care, while simultaneously encouraging appropriateness
of care whenever possible [33]. Respect for professional
values also depends on how, and by whom, a care pay-
ment format is specifically designed [34,35].Finally, we recommend customizing care payment re-
form based on contextual values, according to the
geographical area, which should be examined further in
future research.
Conclusion
To ensure the support of stakeholders, future care pay-
ment reform should actively incent effectiveness and pa-
tient safety, both in terms of inducing improvement and
avoiding harm. Payment system design should increase
provider wellness in other ways than offering financial
security. As the DCE showed, if policy makers pay suffi-
cient and convincing attention to intended and unin-
tended consequences on the full pallet of healthcare
objectives, physicians and healthcare executives may
positively trade off part of their financial security. Their
end point, however, depends on the health system in
which they operate. Priorities should be further custom-
ized according to the local context of care. Future
research should examine whether our findings can be
confirmed at the level of individual countries, using a
probability sample. Furthermore, also the perspective of
patients and the general public as a whole should be
included in future DCEs, since objectives of care relate
to the general priorities that citizens hold for their health
system.
Appendix A: Bayesian D-optimal partial profile
design consisting of three surveys for the DCE
The design of the DCE involved three surveys of 18
choice sets with two alternative combinations of
performance outcomes. The surveys appear in Tables 4,
5 and 6. The choice sets in each survey were presented in
a randomized order to the respondents and each survey
was filled out by about 180 respondents. The eleven attri-
butes correspond to the eleven performance domains of
Table 1. The ‘+’ sign denotes the positive outcome in each
performance domain, ‘N’ denotes the no change or neutral
outcome, and the ‘–’ sign denotes the negative outcome.
Constant attributes that are dropped from the choice sets
are indicated by ‘*’ and ‘§’ signs. Each choice set has at
least six constant attributes. For choice sets that have
more than six constant attributes, the additional constant
attributes are indicated by the ‘§’ sign.
Appendix B: Multivariate normal prior parameter
distribution used to construct the Bayesian
D-optimal partial profile design for the DCE
To construct the Bayesian D-optimal partial profile
design for the DCE shown in Appendix A, we used a
multivariate normal prior distribution that reflects the
prior beliefs about the unknown parameter values asso-
ciated with the attribute levels, i.e. the care payment
reform outcomes in the eleven performance domains.
Table 4 Survey 1 of the Bayesian D-optimal partial profile
design
Choice Attributes
set 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 * * * * + N + – * * –
1 * * * * N – – + * * N
2 * * – * * – * + – N *
2 * * + * * N * N N – *
3 * * – * * + N + N * *
3 * * + * * N + – – * *
4 * * N + * – * – * + *
4 * * – N * + * N * – *
5 * – * * § § * * * N +
5 * N * * § § * * * + –
6 * N * § – * N + * * *
6 * – * § N * – – * * *
7 * – * * N + * * * – –
7 * N * * – N * * * N +
8 * N § – – * * * N * *
8 * – § N N * * * – * *
9 * + N * + * N * * + *
9 * N + * N * – * * – *
10 N * * § * * + + § * *
10 – * * § * * – N § * *
11 N * * * * + – – – * *
11 + * * * * – + N + * *
12 + * * * N * * N N * –
12 – * * * + * * – + * N
13 N * * * + – * * * N –
13 + * * * N N * * * + N
14 + * * N * + * * – * N
14 – * * – * N * * + * +
15 + * * – * * N – * + *
15 – * * + * * – + * – *
16 – * – * N * + * * * N
16 + * + * – * – * * * +
17 – + – * * * – * * * +
17 + N + * * * N * * * N
18 N – + N * * N * * * *
18 – N N – * * + * * * *
Table 5 Survey 2 of the Bayesian D-optimal partial profile
design
Choice Attributes
set 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
19 * * * * + § – * – * N
19 * * * * N § N * N * –
20 * * * * – N § N § * *
20 * * * * N – § + § * *
21 * * * + – § * * + * –
21 * * * – N § * * N * +
22 * * * N N * * N * N N
22 * * * + + * * + * – –
23 * * – N * * * * N + –
23 * * + – * * * * + – N
24 * * + + * * N * * – N
24 * * N N * * – * * + –
25 * N * * + * * N + – *
25 * – * * – * * + – N *
26 * – * * – + + * * * N
26 * + * * N – N * * * –
27 * – * + * * * – N * +
27 * + * – * * * + + * –
28 * N § + § * – * * * *
28 * – § – § * + * * * *
29 * N N * * + * * * – +
29 * – – * * N * * * + –
30 * – N * * N * + * * +
30 * + – * * – * – * * N
31 + * § § * * – * * N *
31 N * § § * * + * * + *
32 N * * * N N – N * * *
32 + * * * – + + – * * *
33 N N * * * * N * – + *
33 + – * * * * + * + N *
34 – + * N * * * * – – *
34 N N * – * * * * + N *
35 N + – § * N * * * * *
35 + N N § * + * * * * *
36 + – – * – * * * * + *
36 – + + * N * * * * – *
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ranked the eleven performance domains in order of im-
portance and specified mean parameter values and vari-
ances for the multivariate normal prior distribution.
Table 7 shows the eleven performance domains in
order of importance. The more important a domain is
believed to be prior to our study, the larger in magnitude
the a priori mean utility values specified for the maineffects of that domain. Note that the utility values asso-
ciated with the outcomes in each performance domain
sum to zero. This is because we used effects coding for
the outcomes which means that we coded the negative
outcome as [1 0], the neutral outcome as [0 1] and the
positive outcome as [-1 -1]. To indicate that people are loss
averse, we chose larger absolute mean values for the nega-
tive outcome in each domain than for the positive
Table 6 Survey 3 of the Bayesian D-optimal partial profile
design
Choice Attributes
set 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
37 * * + * * § + § * § *
37 * * N * * § – § * § *
38 * * + * * * – N – + *
38 * * N * * * + – N – *
39 * * + § * + * * § + *
39 * * – § * – * * § N *
40 * * – * N * + * N * +
40 * * + * + * N * – * –
41 * – * * * N + * N – *
41 * N * * * + N * – + *
42 * + * + * + * N * * –
42 * – * N * – * + * * N
43 * N * – – * + N * * *
43 * – * + N * N + * * *
44 * N N * N * * + – * *
44 * + + * + * * N N * *
45 – * * * * * * + N N N
45 + * * * * * * N + – –
46 – * * § * – + * * * +
46 + * * § * + – * * * N
47 – * § N N * * * N * *
47 + * § + + * * * + * *
48 – * * N + * * N * N *
48 + * * – N * * + * + *
49 + * * + – N * * * – *
49 N * * N N – * * * + *
50 – * + – * + * * * * +
50 + * N + * – * * * * N
51 + – * * * * * N * – +
51 N + * * * * * – * + N
52 N – * + * + * * N * *
52 – N * N * N * * + * *
53 – + + * * * * N * * –
53 N – N * * * * – * * +
54 – – N * + * * * N * *
54 N + + * N * * * – * *
Table 7 A priori order of importance of the main effects
of the eleven performance domains and conversion into
mean utility values and variances for the multivariate
normal prior distribution
Rank Performance domain Prior mean Prior
variance– N +
1 Clinical effectiveness and
patient safety
−0.6 0.1 0.5 0.09
2 Best practice service use −0.4 0.05 0.35 0.06
Long term cost containment
and budget safety
−0.4 0.05 0.35 0.06
3 Gaming the system −0.35 0.05 0.3 0.04
Care equity −0.35 0.05 0.3 0.04
Care coordination, teamwork
and continuity
−0.35 0.05 0.3 0.04
4 Timeliness −0.3 0.05 0.25 0.02
Patient centeredness −0.3 0.05 0.25 0.02
Innovation −0.3 0.05 0.25 0.02
Provider wellness −0.3 0.05 0.25 0.02
Short term cost containment
and budget safety
−0.3 0.05 0.25 0.02
The mean values are associated with the negative (–), neutral (N) and positive
(+) outcomes in each performance domain. Variances around the mean values
are the same for all three outcomes in a performance domain and are
therefore listed only once.
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values for the neutral outcome are slightly larger than zero.
For the prior variances around the mean utility values,
we wanted to preserve the natural rank order of the out-
comes in each performance domain. We therefore chose
variances such that the standard deviations are smaller
than the difference between the mean values for the
positive and neutral outcomes in a performance domain.Following a suggestion of Kessels et al. [36], we also
specified negative covariances between the prior utility
values associated with each performance domain. We
computed these covariances using a correlation coeffi-
cient of -0.5, such that for the performance domains in
each of the four ranks the covariances equal -0.05, -0.03,
-0.02 and -0.01, respectively.
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